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SECTION 1983 AND THE TORT OF MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION: A TENTH CIRCUIT HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The malicious prosecution doctrine of 42 U.S.C. § 1983' (hereinaf-
ter § 1983) has been the source of much confusion and the cause of a
long term split in the circuit courts. 2 With regards to this particular con-
stitutional tort doctrine, the courts have experienced two separate contro-
versial splits.3 The first split occurred over whether a federal claim for
malicious prosecution even existed under § 1983. 4 The Supreme Court
has, in recent history, resolved this issue by validating § 1983 malicious
prosecution claims in cases such as Heck v. Humphrey5 and Albright v.
Oliver.6
The modem split concerning § 1983 malicious prosecution claims
lies not in whether the claim exists, but rather in how a successful claim
of this nature must be pleaded.7 Specifically, the circuits are split over
whether a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim requires a showing of only
constitutional deprivation, or of both a constitutional deprivation, as well
as the common law tort elements. 8
In an attempt to clarify exactly where the Tenth Circuit stands in
this chaotic doctrine, this Article focuses on the Tenth Circuit's historical
implementation of § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, as well as the
Court's current stance on this issue. Part I of this Article explains the
historical context through which malicious prosecution crept into § 1983
litigation. This section looks at how the circuits split over the malicious
prosecution issue, and how the Tenth Circuit has sided in that split. Part
II provides an analysis of the modem circuit split over how to properly
frame a constitutional malicious prosecution claim. This section looks at
the split both generally, and more specifically in light of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's most recent decision of Pierce v. Gilchrist.9 Part In offers an
analysis of why the circuits continue to disagree over the application of
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
2. See generally Jacques L. Schillaci, Comment, Unexamined Premises: Toward Doctrinal
Purity in § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Doctrine, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 439,452-62 (2002).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 452.
5. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
6. 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
7. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 459.
8. Id. at 459-62.
9. 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
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§ 1983 malicious prosecution actions, and, specifically, why the Tenth
Circuit's approach is most suitable.'
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Development of § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Claims
Section 1983 developed from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, an en-
actment aimed at protecting the rights of former slaves.
11 After the adop-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment, the southern states proceeded to enact
codes requiring former slaves to work for their previous owners.
12 In an
attempt to put an end to this underhanded method of maintaining slavery,
the federal government enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 via the
Fourteenth Amendment's authority. 13 The first section of this Act is now
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.14
While the Act did effectively deter state enactments of "black
codes,"' 5 the statute sat "virtually dormant" until the mid-twentieth cen-
tury when courts began interpreting the statute's scope.
16 In the land-
mark decision of Monroe v. Pape,17 the Supreme Court "broaden[ed] the
scope of § 1983 liability to encompass wrongdoing by state officials
even when [the wrongdoing] was not officially sanctioned by state
law."' 8 The Monroe decision set into motion the broadening evolution of
§ 1983 claims. Specifically, the decision provided for greater interpreta-
tion of the statute's "under the color of state law" language.
19
Malicious prosecution is a suit brought by a victim of a maliciously
instituted prosecution. 20 The claimant in a malicious prosecution action
brings suit only after the termination of the allegedly malicious proceed-
ings.21 The doctrine of constitutional malicious prosecution developed
as a result of a broadened understanding of § 1983's scope.
22 In the be-
ginning, claimants brought federal constitutional claims under § 1983 in
conjunction with a state malicious prosecution tort action.
23 As a result
of these joint claims some federal courts began to recognize a conjoined
10. Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1290.
11. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 446.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 447.
14. id.
15. Id. at 446 (describing codes that, despite the emancipation of slaves, forced African
Americans to maintain working for their former masters).
16. Esther M. Schonfeld, Article, Malicious Prosecution as a Constitutional Tort: Continued
Confusion and Uncertainty, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1681, 1689 (1999).
17. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
18. Schiilaci, supra note 2, at 451 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187).
19. Id. at 450.
20. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Compensatory Damages for
Malicious Prosecution, 50 A.L.R. 4th 843, § 2(a) (2004).
21. Id.
22. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 451-52.
23. Id.
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federal malicious prosecution action under § 1983.24 However, this new
claim did not develop without criticism. In reality, the recognition by
some circuits of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim developed into the
first of two circuit splits.
2 5
The circuits divided nearly down the middle with the Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits recognizing a malicious prosecution
claim under § 1983, and the First, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits re-
jecting such a claim. 26 The courts that allowed the new § 1983 action
reasoned that since a malicious prosecution claim required a showing of
malice in prosecution, it was inherently also a constitutional violation.27
Alternatively, those circuits opposing § 1983 malicious prosecution
claims rejected the notion that criminal prosecutions lacking probable
cause were per se constitutional violations. 28 Because there existed nei-
ther a constitutional nor a federal statute that expressly mentioned mali-
cious prosecution, these circuits further argued that the common law tort
elements alone were not sufficient to base a constitutional claim. 29
B. The Tenth Circuit's Approach to Early § 1983 Malicious Prosecution
Claims
The Tenth Circuit joined the other circuits who embraced the new
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claim. The Tenth Circuit first showed its
inclination to allow a federal malicious prosecution claim in the case of
Taylor v. Nichols.30 This case involved a § 1983 claim brought by a po-
lice officer in federal district court.3' The officer was accused of crimi-
nal assault and battery stemming from a routine traffic stop.32 The offi-
cer was investigated, arrested, detained, and, eventually, acquitted of the
33allegations. After being acquitted, the officer brought suit against the
person alleging criminal assault, as well as the prosecuting attorney in
the case.34 The federal district court granted defendants' motion to dis-
miss holding that the alleged injury was not actionable under the Civil
Rights Act because the alleged defendant in the case was not acting un-
der the color of state law.35 The officer appealed the case to the Tenth




26. Id. at 452-53.
27. Id. at 452.
28. Id. at 453-54.
29. Id. at 454.
30. 558 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1977).
31. Taylor, 558 F.2d at 563-64.
32. Id. at 563.
33. Id. at 563-64.
34. Id. at 564.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 565.
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The Tenth Circuit rejected the officer's claim on the same basis as
the lower court decision-the person alleging criminal assault was not a
state actor.37 While the court ultimately dismissed the claim, the decision
was important because the court acknowledged the viability of a § 1983
malicious prosecution claim.3 s The court reasoned that:
The tort case of malicious prosecution is not coterminous in its ele-
ments with a civil rights suit based upon misuse of the process. True,
the same facts could give rise to violations under both federal and
state law, but color of state law would have to be present in order to
have a civil rights case.
39
While this case did not embrace entirely the idea of a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim, it certainly opened the Tenth Circuit's door to the
possibility of hearing such a claim.
In 1984, the Tenth Circuit permanently accepted the idea of a fed-
eral malicious prosecution action.
40 In Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc.,41
the Tenth Circuit acknowledged and upheld a § 1983 malicious prosecu-
tion claim. In allowing the claim, the court particularized the level of
deprivation necessary to comprise a constitutional violation.
42 The court
reasoned that "not every tort amounts to a deprivation of constitutional
rights"; however, "when private parties or public officials use criminal
complaints to coerce a release of civil liability from injured persons, this
action, as a malicious prosecution, is egregious and qualifies as a depri-
vation of due process that violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
4 3 Hav-
ing finally recognized a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the Tenth
Circuit proceeded to further define the claim in its subsequent decisions.
In 1990 the Tenth Circuit decided the malicious prosecution case of
Robinson v. Muraffi.44 Robinson alleged that defendant police officers
knowingly permitted the use of false testimony in his prosecution.
45
Robinson had allegedly killed one of the defendants' fellow police offi-
cers. 46 The defendant police officers argued that because the chain of
causation between the police misconduct and the actual grand jury in-
dictment was broken by subsequent independent acts of the prosecutor,
the officers were not liable.47 The court rejected this reasoning, stating
that "[i]f police officers have been instrumental in the plaintiffs contin-
37. Id. at 564.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1431 (10th Cir. 1984).
41. Lusby, 749 F.2d at 1423.
42. Id. at 1431.
43. Id.
44. 895 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1990).
45. Robinson, 895 F.2d at 651.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 655.
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ued confinement or prosecution, they cannot escape liability by pointing
to the decisions of prosecutors or grand jurors or magistrates to confine
or prosecute him."4 In extending malicious prosecution actions to police
officers, the court clearly broadened the previous scope of malicious
prosecution claims in the Tenth Circuit.49
The Lusby and Robinson cases not only show the development of
the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim in the Tenth Circuit, but also
exhibit the broadening scope of the claim generally. In the beginning,
malicious prosecution claims were directed only at the prosecuting attor-
ney. As the subsequent case law indicates, however, § 1983 malicious
prosecution claims later extended to government actors such as police
officers, investigators, and others involved in the pre-trial process.5°
II. THE MODERN § 1983 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CIRCUIT SPLIT
Today it is clear that the Tenth Circuit recognizes § 1983 malicious
prosecution claims; however, prior to 1994, some circuits remained op-
posed to the implementation of the new action. The jurisdictions that
recognized the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim soon faced a new
uncertainty within the doctrine-how to properly implement the new
claim. Due to the "embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion" in the
area, the Supreme Court decided to reconcile the matter by granting cer-
tiorari in Albright v. Oliver.
51
A. The Supreme Court's "Clarification": Albright v. Oliver
Admitting that the majority of circuits recognized some form of a
viable malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the Court focused in-
stead on the modern split among the circuits. The modern concern over
malicious prosecution claims was not whether the § 1983 claim existed,
but rather, whether malicious prosecution, standing alone, could violate
the Constitution. 53 The Court identified the two differing views that di-
vided the circuits. The first, more expansive, view contended that the
elements of a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 were equivalent
to that of the common law tort.54 Under this contention, a party claiming
malicious prosecution must meet the following elements: (i) the bringing
of the action by the defendant, (ii) its successful termination in favor of
the plaintiff, (iii) want of probable cause to bring the action, (iv) malice,
48. Id. at 656 (quoting Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985,994 (7th Cir. 1988)).
49. Id. (stating that police officers can no longer hide behind the officials they have de-
frauded).
50. See, e.g., Taylor, 558 F.2d at 561 (§ 1983 claim against attorney); Lusby, 749 F.2d at 1423
(§ 1983 claim against off-duty police officer acting as security guard); Robinson, 895 F.2d at 649 (§
1983 claim against police officer).
51. 510 U.S. 266, 271 n.4 (1994) (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir.
1992)).
52. Albnght, 510 U.S. at 271 n.4.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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and (v) damages." The opposing circuits maintained that common law
tort elements were not sufficient to support a § 1983 claim. Rather, these
circuits contended that an action required a showing of some injury or
deprivation of a constitutional magnitude in addition to the traditional
elements of common law malicious prosecution.
56
The Albright Court hoped to clarify the chaotic malicious prosecu-
tion doctrine; however, somewhere in the midst of its analysis, the Court
swayed from its original goal. Instead, the Court addressed the issue of
which constitutional claim produces a proper foundation for such claims,
leaving the pleading issue completely unsettled.5 7 In its redirected analy-
sis the Court concluded: "Section 1983 'is not itself a source of substan-
tive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights
elsewhere conferred."58 Thus the Court asserted that § 1983 is not the
underlying basis of an alleged civil rights claim, but rather the vehicle for
raising such an action.59 The court reasoned that "Section 1983 'fulfills
the procedural or remedial role of authorizing the assertion of the claim
for relief.' However, the statute itself does not grant or create any sub-
stantive rights. Therefore, plaintiffs . . . must rely on another source,
such as the United States Constitution or a federal statute, for the sub-
stantive rights they seek to enforce., 60 Having established the necessity
of a substantive foundation for relief, it was then essential to determine
what constitutional or statutory basis was most appropriate.
While the issue of how to properly establish a § 1983 malicious
prosecution claim remained unanswered by the Court, the Albright deci-
sion did clarify what constitutional deprivation was required by § 1983.61
Previously, many claimants based their § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim upon a Fourteenth Amendment due process foundation.
62 The
Court in Albright rejected this basis, finding that "[w]here a particular
Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protec-
tion' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment,
not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the
guide for analyzing these claims."' 63 This decision falls clearly in line
with the Court's unwillingness to further expand the boundaries of sub-
stantive due process.64 Although the court articulated that due process
55. Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2004).
56. Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 n.4.
57. Id. at 271.
58. Id. (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
59. Id.
60. Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1698-99 (citing Martin A. Schwartz & John E. Kirklin,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § IA, IB, IC (3d ed. 1997); Chapman v. Hous-
ton Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3
(1979)).
61. Albright, 510 U.S. at 271.
62. See, e.g., Lusby, 749 F.2d at 1423.
63. Albright, 510 U.S. at 273 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
64. Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1717.
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was an inadequate basis for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, it sug-
gested instead that the Fourth Amendment would provide a more
'explicit' textual support upon which claimants could rely.65 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist reasoned that the "Fourth Amendment relates to 'depriva-
tions of liberty that go hand in hand with criminal prosecutions,"' and,
thus, provides the proper foundation for § 1983 malicious prosecution
claims.
66
B. The Aftermath of Albright
Two certainties have evolved from the Albright decision: first, the
use of due process as a foundation for § 1983 malicious prosecution ac-
tions is no longer permitted, and second, virtually all federal circuit
courts now recognize malicious prosecution as a § 1983 constitutional
tort.67 The aftermath of the Albright decision has also resulted in uncer-
tainty with regards to the proper pleading requirements of this new con-
stitutional tort.68
The Albright decision left the circuits to decide which, if any, ele-
ments are necessary conditions of a constitutional malicious prosecution
claim. The circuits are currently split over the proper resolution to this
dilemma creating both a majority and minority rule.69 The majority rule,
upheld by the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits,
requires plaintiffs to show only a Fourth Amendment deprivation.70
These circuit courts argue that because § 1983 claims develop from
Fourth Amendment deprivations, and because the language of the
amendment mentions nothing of unreasonable prosecutions, it is unnec-
essary to require the common law tort elements to be pleaded.71
The minority rule, to which the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits subscribe, requires that a plaintiff demonstrate both a Fourth
Amendment violation in addition to the common law elements of mali-
cious prosecution.72 These circuits view § 1983 malicious prosecution
liability as tort actions that implicate constitutional rights.73 As such, the
minority circuits argue that the best method of analysis is to "borrow" the
elements of the underlying malicious prosecution claim from state law
and apply them to the federal § 1983 claim. 74
65. Albright, 510 U.S. at 275.
66. Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1718 (quoting Albright, 510 U.S. at 274).
67. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 459.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 460-61.
71. Id. at 461.
72. Id. at 459.
73. Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1994).
74. Cook, 41 F.3d at 79.
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C. The Tenth Circuit's Shift in Analysis
The Tenth Circuit has taken an interesting stance in the controversy
over how properly to present a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. In a
series of post-Albright decisions, the circuit has recognized that the
common law elements of malicious prosecution are a "starting point" for
§ 1983 claims.75 This "starting point" analysis differs substantially from
the other majority rule circuits in that the other circuits require absolutely
no examination of common law elements. 76 The Tenth Circuit's "start-
ing point" analysis, while unique, has also caused some confusion within
the Tenth Circuit. As discussed later, this confusion was recently clari-
fied by the Tenth Circuit's decision of Pierce v. Gilchrist.
77
To see the Tenth Circuit's post-Albright transition, it is most benefi-
cial to examine the court's more recent decisions in chronological order.
One of the first Tenth Circuit cases to follow the Albright decision was
the unpublished opinion of Sack v. Huggins.78 In Sack, the Tenth Circuit
looked to the Fifth Circuit's minority rule precedent, and held that the
common law element requiring that the criminal proceedings be termi-
nated in plaintiff s favor prior to a malicious prosecution claim is a nec-
essary common law element.79 Alone, this case would suggest that the
Tenth Circuit had sided with the minority rule requiring that common
law elements be shown.
In 1995, however, the court apears to invoke the opposite rule in
its decision of Garcia v. Johnson. In this decision, the court looked
away from the common law elements and invoked a more "majority
rule" analysis. The Garcia court consciously made a distinction between
the plaintiff s claim following state tort law versus constitutional tort law
under § 1983.81 The court went on to state that the plaintiff "can only
maintain this claim if the allegations in his complaint rise to the level of a
constitutional violation., 82  In making such an intentional distinction
between state tort law and constitutional tort law, the court's rationale in
this case seems to fall more in line with the majority rule, than that of the
minority.
The Tenth Circuit further employed the "starting point" analysis in
both the Sanders v. Howlett8 3 and Wolford v. Lasater84 decisions. While
75. See, e.g., Sanders v. Howlett, 1995 WL 143460 (10th Cir. March 30, 1995) (unpublished
table decision); Wolford v. Lasater, 78 F.3d 484 (10th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556
(10th Cir. 1996); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
76. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 460-61.
77. 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
78. 1994 WL 413271 (10th Cir. Aug. 1, 1994) (unpublished table decision).
79. Sack, 1994 WL 413271, at *4 (citing Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d, 1178, 1183-84 (5th
Cir. 1991)).
80. 1995 WL 492879 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 1995) (unpublished table decision).
81. Garcia, 1995 WL 492879, at *5.
82. Id.
83. 1995 WL 143460 (10th Cir. Mar. 30, 1995) (unpublished table decision).
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continuing with this analysis, the court added to its rationale by imple-
menting an analysis of the probable cause element that is required in
common law malicious prosecution claims. 85 In Sanders, the court re-
marked that in Kansas, the lack of probable cause to initiate criminal
proceedings "is an essential element of the tort of malicious prosecu-
tion.' '86 In Wolford, the probable cause element is the ultimate basis by
which the court dismissed the claimant's malicious prosecution claim.
87
In its reasoning, the court cited New Mexico precedent that under "state
tort law, lack of probable cause to initiate criminal proceedings is an
essential element of the tort of malicious prosecution."88 The Wolford
decision went a step further than that of the Sanders decision, however,
in combining both a state malicious prosecution analysis of probable
cause with a Fourth Amendment analysis of probable cause.89  The
court's transition to include both a common law and Fourth Amendment
analysis of the probable cause issue signifies a shift in the court's reason-
ing from common law tort elements to constitutional analysis; this shift
becomes even more apparent in its later decisions.
The court's transition in analysis is more clearly evidenced in Tay-
lor v. Meacham.90 In Taylor, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged its confu-
sion of the issue, and its previous inconsistent decisions.91 The Taylor
court recognized the need for a solid announcement of malicious prose-
cution pleading requirements in the Tenth Circuit. Unfortunately, at
some point the court lost its focus and failed to provide the much antici-
pated "clarification." Instead of announcing a hard and fast rule as to
whether the court requires a showing of common law elements, the court
responded, once again, with a "starting point" analysis.92
While the court did not provide an express rule, it did make another
small step in clarifying the "muddied waters" of the post-Albright mali-
cious prosecution claim. In the midst of the court's "starting point"
analysis it stated "our circuit takes the common law elements of mali-
cious prosecution as the 'starting point' for the analysis of a § 1983 mali-
cious prosecution claim, but always reaches the ultimate question, which
it must, of whether the plaintiff has proven a constitutional violation. 93
The constitutional violation at issue in this case was a deprivation of
Fourth Amendment rights.94 In fact, the court seemed to focus its analy-
84. 78 F.3d 484 (10th Cir. 1996).
85. Lasater, 78 F.3d at 489.
86. Sanders, 1995 WL 143460, at *2.
87. Wolford, 78 F.3d at 489.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 82 F.3d 1556 (10th Cir. 1996).
91. Taylor, 82 F.3d at 1561.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 1... at 1562.
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sis primarily on the constitutional violation rather than on a common law
tort analysis.95 Accordingly, the court's shift in focus shows the court's
inclination toward the majority rule § 1983 malicious prosecution analy-
sis.
D. Pierce v. Gilchrist
96
1. Facts
In 2004, the Tenth Circuit was faced with its most shocking mali-
cious prosecution case. The drastic nature of the claim, and the obvious
need for an adequate remedy arguably pressured the court to come for-
ward with a hard and fast rule by which to implement § 1983 malicious
prosecution claims.
Plaintiff, Jeffrey Pierce, was convicted of first degree rape, oral
sodomy, second degree burglary, and assault with a dangerous weapon,
and sentenced to sixty-five years in prison.97 After serving fifteen years
of this sentence, Pierce was exonerated, and his conviction and sentence
were vacated.98 Pierce thereafter filed suit against the forensic analyst,
the Oklahoma City District Attorney, and other governmental units for
compensatory and punitive damages.
99
The events leading to Pierce's conviction and incarceration demon-
strated an offensive abuse of prosecutorial power. On May 8, 1985, a
woman named Sandra Burton was raped in her home. 1° Ms. Burton
lived at the same apartment complex where Pierce was employed as a
landscaper. 10 1 Shortly after the rape, Pierce was taken to the police sta-
tion to participate in a lineup.10 2 Pierce took part in the identification
proceedings, but was not identified as the rapist.10 3 Almost a year later,
pursuant to a warrant, Pierce was arrested again as a suspect in the rape
investigation. 104 Pierce's body was searched, and samples of his head
and pubic hairs, as well as body fluids, were collected for investiga-
tion. 10 5 Five minutes after the samples were collected, Pierce was noti-




96. 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
97. Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1282.
98. Id. at 1283.
99. Id. at 1281.
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The forensic analysis was conducted by the defendant, Joyce Gil-
christ. 1 7 Gilchrist's report claimed to identify thirty-three scalp and pu-
bic hairs from the crime scene that were "microscopically consistent"
with those taken from Pierce's body.'08 As a result of these findings,
Pierce was charged with first degree rape, oral sodomy, second degree
burglary, and assault with a dangerous weapon, and later convicted.1t 9
Pierce would have served his sixty-five year sentence had the FBI
not conducted an investigation of Gilchrist's forensic work."0 The FBI
released a report in 2001 reflecting that five out of eight cases being in-
vestigated involved "contrived and erroneous statements by Ms. Gilchrist
regarding identification of persons.""' Furthermore, the report revealed
that Gilchrist had "repeatedly made statements beyond the limits of fo-
rensic science. '  It was also later uncovered that Gilchrist had been
professionally reprimanded on various occasions, and had been expelled
from the Association of Crime Scene Reconstruction for providing mis-
represented evidence not factually supported by science. "
3
As a result of the FBI's findings, particularly that Pierce's hairs
were microscopically inconsistent with the hairs found at the crime
scene, the police ordered a DNA analysis of the Pierce case evidence. It
was this DNA analysis that exonerated Pierce, and led to his vacated
conviction and sentence. 14 Thereafter, Pierce brought suit under § 1983
for malicious prosecution to which Gilchrist moved for summary judg-
ment, claiming that she was provided qualified immunity and that Pierce
had failed to state an actionable claim." 5 The district court denied de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that a jury could rea-
sonably conclude that the defendant's actions were instrumental in
Pierce's post-trial confinement. 1 6 Gilchrist appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which upheld the district court's find-
ing."
7
Defendant Gilchrist appealed on the basis that Pierce failed to plead
all of the "required" common law malicious prosecution elements
18
Specifically, Gilchrist alleged that the plaintiff did not and could not




110. See id. at 1283 (discussing how an independent FBI investigation prompted the police
department to send the Pierce case evidence for DNA analysis; the result exonerated Pierce, and his
sentence was accordingly vacated).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1284.
114. Id. at 1283.
115. Id. at 1284-85.
116. Id. at 1285.
117. Id. at 1285, 1301.
118. Id. at 1286.
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tion claim-that the action against Pierce was brought by Gilchrist her-
self and that there was a want of probable cause."19 Gilchrist's argument
hit directly to the question the Tenth Circuit had managed to avoid an-
swering: At what point does the "starting point" analysis of common law
malicious prosecution elements end, and a constitutional analysis begin?
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit finally answered this longstanding question by
holding that Gilchrist misunderstood the "starting point" analysis articu-
lated in previous case law.120 The court announced that the first step in
its analysis was to identify a constitutional violation. 121 The court, pur-
suant to Albright, recognized the Fourth Amendment as the most perti-
nent of Plaintiffs alleged claims. 122 Next, the court maintained that the
"[p]laintiff's actual cause of action is for a constitutional violation under
§ 1983; the common law tort of malicious prosecution is relevant only as
,,123an analogy that is helpful in structuring the legal analysis. The court
identified the usefulness in applying the common law principles as a way
to structure a claim; however, it rejected entirely the notion that pleading
common law elements was necessary.1
24
While the court explicitly rejected the necessity of pleading com-
mon law elements, it continued to address Gilchrist's allegations, and
asserted that, even had the court required a showing of all elements,
Pierce's claim would still succeed.125  The court first examined Gil-
christ's allegation that her lack of involvement in procuring the arrest
warrant exonerated her from the § 1983 claim. 26 Ultimately, Gilchrist
contended that the plaintiff s claim failed to prove the first common law
element, and, thus, failed to state a claim. 127 The court responded to this
allegation by looking at the plain language of § 1983, and reasoning that
the statute not only applies to someone "who 'subjects,' but also to any
person who 'causes to be subjected ... any citizen of the United States
.. to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws."", 28 As this language suggests, the court rec-
ognized that Congress intended not only for a person who formally initi-
ates prosecution to fall within the bounds of § 1983, but rather for any
119. Id. at 1287.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1285.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1286 n.3 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 1290.
125. See id. at 1290-97 (stating "[W]e fail to see the logic in a position that would confine
constitutional claims to the precise rubric of tort law," but nevertheless addressing each of Gil-
christ's common-law assertions).
126. Id. at 1291.
127. Id. at 1287.
128. Id. at 1292 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (emphasis added)).
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state actor who causes a deprivation of constitutional rights to fall within
the statute. 129 Gilchrist clearly fell within this definition.
30
Second, the court looked at Gilchrist's argument that "under Okla-
homa law, existence of probable cause at the time of arrest, is a complete
defense to malicious prosecution," thus implying that the third common
law tort element of malicious prosecution was lacking.' 3' The court re-
sponded to this argument by asserting that "'[e]ven when probable cause
is present at the time of the arrest, evidence could later surface which
would eliminate that probable cause."" 32  While the victim's photo-
graphic identification may have been sufficient to initially arrest Pierce,
the court held that probable cause was completely lacking when the hair
and blood enzyme analysis exonerated the plaintiff from being the rap-
ist.
133
The court's decision in Pierce provided an opportunity for Pierce to
obtain redress for the fifteen years that were taken from him. In addition,
the court's decision was also a touchstone for the Tenth Circuit. Nearly a
decade after the Supreme Court decided Albright, the Tenth Circuit fi-
nally articulated a clear strategy for implementing § 1983 malicious
prosecution claims.
III. ANALYSIS
While the Tenth Circuit has managed to clearly articulate its posi-
tion on interpreting § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, the other cir-
cuits remain split over which analysis is superior. 134 In an effort to make
an informed conclusion as to which is the better method, it is necessary
to look at both the practical and theoretical implications of each mode of
analysis. After examining the implications of each method, it is clear
that the majority rule, to which the Tenth Circuit subscribes, is the most
efficient and effective method of interpretation.
A. Practical Implications
1. Inarticulate Pleading Requirements Result in Claim Dismissal
and Barred Recovery
The pleading stage of a claim can be one of the most important and
influential stages of litigation. Having a strong initial complaint is an
extremely important method of initial presentation, but more importantly
it is the required showing by which the claimant must prove that she is
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1293.
131. Id. at 1295.
132. Id. (quoting the district court opinion).
133. Id. at 1293-94.
134. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 459.
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entitled to relief and demand a judgment for that relief.135 It remains
common legal knowledge that "fail[ing] to state a claim upon which re-
lief can be granted" under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
12(b)(6) necessitates a dismissal. 36 This concern of 12(b)(6) dismissal
becomes an imminent realization when the uncertainty of § 1983 mali-
cious prosecution pleading requirements is at issue. Such a dismissal is
disappointing to lawyers and potentially devastating to a claimant's at-
tempt at recovery.
As a claimant, it is extremely important to have a clear understand-
ing of a claim's pleading requirements so as not to disregard a necessary
element. Where a cause of action, such as § 1983 malicious prosecution,
has such divergent opinions as to what elements compose the claim, it is
very difficult to confidently plead the action. As such, it is absolutely
necessary to clarify any confusion the circuits have created in this area.
The inarticulate "starting point" language that the Tenth Circuit relied
upon prior to Pierce v. Gilchrist'3 7 did nothing more than confuse § 1983
malicious prosecution and encourage improper pleading. By clearly ar-
ticulating in Pierce that a claimant need not present common law tort
elements, the Tenth Circuit has done its part to avoid such devastating
pleading mistakes. 
138
2. Heightened Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation
Further Exemplify the Need for Less Burdensome Pleading
Standards
The court's decision in Pierce is even more important when consid-
ered in the context of heightened pleading requirements for civil rights
cases. 139 Despite what some would argue is a definitive Supreme Court
decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit,'4° many federal courts have imposed heightened
pleading requirements on claimants as a result of the massive inflow of
civil rights litigation.1 41  In 1993, the Leatherman Court unanimously
rejected the notion of heightened pleading requirements in civil rights
actions, yet left open the question of heightened pleading standards in
135. Evan Sanford Schwartz, A Plea for Help: Pleading Problems in Section 1983 Municipal
Liability Claims, 6 TouRo L. REV. 377, 379 (1990) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2-3)).
136. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6) (stating, "Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in
any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in
the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the
option of the pleader be made by motion: . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.").
137. 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
138. Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1290.
139. See generally Elaine M. Korb & Richard A. Bales, A Permanent Stop Sign: Why Courts
Should Yield to the Temptation to Impose Heightened Pleading Standards in § 1983 Claims, 41
BRANDEIS L.J. 267 (2002) (recognizing the courts' modem trend of imposing heightened pleading
requirements).
140. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
141. Korb & Bales, supra note 139, at 271.
[Vol. 82:3
2005] SECTION 1983 AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION 513
cases involving individual government officials who may assert a quali-
fied immunity defense. 142 This uncertainty has since expanded and cre-
ated its own specific circuit split with regard to the proper level of speci-
ficity in pleading requirements.1
4 3
Furthering the debate over the requisite pleading specificity, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require what is commonly known as
"notice pleading," or more simply, a "'short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."' "44 The leading ra-
tionale for maintaining liberal pleading standards is to allow for adequate
discovery. 145  Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
"adopted in response to stringent state code and common law pleading
standards" because "[s]uch stringent standards permitted courts to dis-
miss colorable claims simply for an inartful draft of the complaint."
' 46
These concerns only further weigh in favor of less burdensome pleading
requirements for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims. Unfortunately,
however, federal notice pleading standards are not uniformly applied to
civil rights cases. 147 Stringent pleading requirements result in the dis-
missal of potentially viable actions before the actual merit of the case is
ever reached. 148 By requiring heightened pleading standards, a claimant
is obligated to "craft their complaints with factual specificity far in ex-
cess of the minimal specificity prescribed by ... general notice plead-
ing. "149 Without a full understanding of what the court requires, a claim-
ant is likely to improperly plead the claim and potentially bar himself
from recovery.
3. Clear Pleading Requirements are a Necessity in Formulating
Litigation Strategy
Should a claimant move beyond the initial pleading phase of litiga-
tion, the need for a clear articulation of the elementary requirements of a
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claim is vital. In properly formulating a
litigation strategy it is essential that both claimants and defendants be
aware of a claim's elements. Requiring a § 1983 claimant to prove
common law tort elements requires a much broader and more challeng-
ing burden.150 By requiring the presence of common law tort elements,
the court potentially allows many constitutional violations to go unpun-
142. Id. at 275-77.
143. See generally id. (evidencing the inter-circuit disagreement over heightened pleading
requirements for civil rights cases).
144. Id. at 270-71 (citing FED. R. Cv. P. 8(a)(2)).
145. Schwartz, supra note 135, at 378.
146. Id. at 379-80.
147. See generally Korb & Bales, supra note 139 (articulating the current split among circuits
over civil rights heightened pleading requirements).
148. Schwartz, supra note 135, at 380.
149. Korb & Bales, supra note 139, at 272.
150. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 469.
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ished and, as a result, for many victims to be without redress.'51 To al-
low for such injustice is in direct conflict with the intention of § 1983.152
Similarly, a defendant must know exactly what elements he is up against,
and how best to strategize his defense. Thus it is equally important for
both plaintiff and defendant to be aware of the necessary § 1983 mali-
cious prosecution requirements in pleading, preparing, and arguing their
case.
B. Theoretical Implications
In addition to the practical implications of successfully pleading a
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claim, there are theoretical implications
that necessitate a clear ruling on the claim's elements. While many
states provide plaintiffs redress via state malicious prosecution claims,
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claims provide a federal alternative to fil-
ing state court actions. 5 3 Furthermore, state malicious prosecution ac-
tions and federal § 1983 actions can be brought concurrently. 154 Because
both state and federal actions are available to claimants, it seems counter-
intuitive to assume that both forums would provide equivalent remedies.
As such, requiring claimants to prove common law tort elements in §
1983 malicious prosecution cases seems to counteract the purpose of an
alternative forum.
1. Statutory Purpose and Scope Demonstrate the Purely Constitu-
tional Nature of § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Actions
The purpose of § 1983 is to "interpose the federal courts between
the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights."'
' 5
Historically, however, the aim of common law tort malicious prosecution
claims has been to protect reputation, bodily integrity and protection of
property. 156 As the primary goals of each action are independent from
the other, it only follows that the claims, themselves, should be consid-
ered separately. The minority circuits have wrongly chosen to intermix
the common law tort elements into what is a purely constitutional § 1983
cause of action. In an analogous § 1983 false imprisonment action, the
Supreme Court even noted that "a public official is liable under § 1983
only 'if he causes the plaintiff to be subjected to deprivation of his con-
stitutional rights. ' ,157 The Court went on to criticize the Fifth Circuit's
employment of "traditional tort-law concepts" in determining a constitu-
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF
SECTION 1983 § 1.56 (4th ed. 2003).
154. Id.
155. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 466 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
156. Id.
157. ld. at 463 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979).
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tional claim. 58 While the Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the
issue of § 1983 malicious prosecution, the Court's statement here pro-
vides for a reasonable analogy to such a claim.
Furthermore, it is clear by the variance in scope between state
claims and § 1983 claims that the two actions are to be treated differ-
ently. Because state malicious prosecutions claims are intended to pro-
tect the reputation and bodily integrity of persons, actions are brought
against any actors that may incite wrongful prosecution. 59 Significantly,
federal malicious prosecution actions are brought against state actors
"under the color of state law."' 160 Similarly, state malicious prosecution
tort claims are available to claimants who have been the victim of misuse
or abuse of civil process. 161 Conversely, § 1983 malicious prosecution
actions are not available subsequent to civil disputes. 162 These diver-
gences in scope clearly depict a vast difference in statutory purpose
based upon the notion of constitutionality. Specifically, this purpose
must be kept in mind when determining the complexity of pleading stan-
dards for the two different claims.
2. Section 1983 Provides Favorable Damage Awards that Federal
Claimants Risk Foreclosure Against as a Result of Common Law
Tort Elements
Damage awards available for common law malicious prosecution
actions have been historically equivalent to that of the § 1983 alterna-
tive. 163 Both compensatory and punitive damages are available in state
and § 1983 malicious prosecution actions respectively. 64 In Oklahoma,
for example, a jury may award punitive damages where the defendant
acted "willfully, wantonly, or in reckless disregard of the rights of an-
other, resulting in injury."' 165 Similarly, the federal § 1983 claim requires
that a defendant's conduct be "motivated by evil motive or intent, or
when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally pro-
tected rights of others."'166 Because both federal and common law claims
require similar evidentiary standards for recovering compensatory and
punitive damages, the concern of foreclosing federal claimants by way of
stricter common law pleading requirements appears slight. However, in
158. Schillaci, supra note 2, at 463.
159. Id. at 467.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 468.
163. Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423, 1436 (10th Cir. 1984).
164. See Zitter, supra note 20, at § 2(a) and Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1698.
165. Lusby, 749 F.2d at 1436 (quoting White v. Conoco, Inc., 710 F.2d 1442, 1448 (10th Cir.
1983)).
166. Id. (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,56 (1983)).
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1976, the equal balance between state and federal malicious prosecution
remedies was tilted. 167
While the remedies available to the separate claims initially appear
consistent, The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Award Act of 1976168 sweet-
ened the federal remedy by authorizing § 1983 claimants to recover at-
torneys' fees. 169 This legislative development not only increased the
damage awards available to § 1983 claimants, but also created another
incentive for claimants to raise their claim federally. 170 Due to costly
litigation expenses, recovery of attorneys' fees is a substantial benefit of
the § 1983 claim. As such, the availability of attorneys' fees provides
yet another reason for requiring only a constitutional pleading require-
ment for § 1983 malicious prosecution claims. By mandating this less
burdensome and more appropriate standard, claimants will have a better
opportunity to recover optimum damages.
3. Requiring Common Law Elements in § 1983 Actions Negates
the Purpose of Providing an Alternative Forum and Potentially
Bars Claimant Recovery
Because § 1983 is aimed at protecting individuals from wrongful
state action, the proper showing for such a claim should only be a consti-
tutional violation. Claimants are already afforded the opportunity to
raise claims of malicious prosecution in state courts by proving the re-
quired malicious prosecution elements. Should the federal courts require
a consistent showing of malicious prosecution elements, the federal fo-
rum would fail to reach the claimants that the state courts have otherwise
overlooked. Many of these disregarded actions are extremely important
claims that are intimately linked with individual freedom. For instance,
it would be inconsistent with the Constitution to deny a man redress after
he has spent fifteen years of his life wrongly imprisoned merely because
he could not procure the common law tort elements of malicious prose-
cution. 71 The Tenth Circuit recognized the inconsistency in this reason-
ing by stating "[i]t would be odd to interpret a statute, § 1983, which was
enacted during Reconstruction to provide a federal remedy for violations
of civil rights countenanced under state law, as simply incorporating the
positive law of the states as a standard for evaluating federal constitu-
tional claims."172 The court further explained that they previously relied
on the common law elements in § 1983 actions "not because of its au-
167. Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1697.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
169. Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1686.
170. Id. at 1697 (attributing the dramatic increase of § 1983 actions, in part, to the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976).
171. See generally Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1288 (stating that § 1983 was enacted to create afederal
remedy for civil rights violations, and that its standards were not intended to be an incorporation of
state law).
172. Id. at 1288.
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thority as positive law, but because. . . 'over the centuries the common
law of torts has developed a set of rules to implement the principle that a
person should be compensated fairly for injuries caused by the violation
of his legal rights'. 17'  Thus it is clear that the common law tort ele-
ments are applicable only by analogy to constitutional tort doctrines.
174
Finally, it has been argued that by relying solely on a showing of
constitutional violation, federal courts will be overburdened by § 1983
claims. 175 While this may initially appear to be the case, careful analysis
reflects that there are other doctrines in place to curtail the influx of
§ 1983 claims. One of these safeguards is the doctrine of qualified im-
munity, which requires that a state official violate clearly established
federal law to be sued. 17 6 Another safeguard provides that § 1983 defen-
dants have the availability of interlocutory appeal from a district court's
determination before the case proceeds.177 As a result of these proce-
dural securities, it is unnecessary to require a showing of common law
tort elements in an attempt to limit § 1983 malicious prosecution claims.
CONCLUSION
The modem status of § 1983 malicious prosecution remains in con-
flict; however, the future appears to be bright. Though the Tenth Cir-
cuit's history of interpreting § 1983 malicious prosecution claims is long
and complex, the court has finally abandoned its inadequate "starting
point" analysis. In doing so, the Tenth Circuit has joined the majority of
circuits in recognizing the importance of separating state and federal
claims. A close analysis clearly reveals that a constitutional deprivation,
and only a constitutional deprivation, is necessary to properly plead a
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claim. Requiring the additional common
law tort elements would be inconsistent with federal pleading require-
ments, the statutory purpose of the claim, and all notions of civil rights
justice.
To conclude, it is useful to consider a statement by Justice Harlan:
"a deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different and more
serious than a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a different
remedy even though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the
deprivation of a constitutional right."' 178 While this issue of § 1983 mali-
cious prosecution interpretation remains controversial, it is my hope that
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Schillaci, supra note 2, at 471.
176. Id.
177. id.
178. Schonfeld, supra note 16, at 1765 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
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the minority circuits will closely review the majority's rationale and real-
ize the civil rights threat that accompanies their employed methodology.
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